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CHAPTER 7 
Where Is the Risk? Is Agricultural Banking Really 
More Difficult than Other Sectors? 
Klaus Maurer1 
1 Introduction2 
Banks and other financial institutions have been extremely reluctant to engage in 
rural finance – and even more so in agricultural finance – for a number of reasons. 
The remoteness of rural clients coupled with poor rural infrastructure and lack of 
branch networks imply a high cost of service delivery and, as a result, profitability 
is assumed to be low. The other main reason why commercial banks refrain from 
venturing into rural areas is the “high risk” associated with agricultural lending. 
Is the “high risk” real and substantiated, or is it only perceived by banks? Is ag-
ricultural finance really more risky than finance in other sectors? Are the risks in 
agricultural finance too prohibitively high to be managed? These are some of the 
main questions of this chapter. 
The topic is risk and risk management in agricultural finance. In a first step, the 
chapter defines, classifies, and analyzes the different types of risks in agricultural 
finance. A key message is that the specific risks of agricultural finance need to be 
seen and put into perspective with other risks. Based on this distinction, different 
approaches to risk management are developed. A segmentation of risks into layers 
serves as a basis for structured risk management solutions that involve the farmers 
themselves, the markets, and the government. Implications and perspectives are 
outlined in the final section, including the role of government and donors. 
Agriculture and agricultural finance encompasses the whole range of producers 
and target groups from small, family farm households to specialized, SME-type 
commercial farmers to large agricultural enterprises and agribusinesses. However, 
access to finance has been most severely limited for small farmers and – to a cer-
                                                          
1  Chairman of the Supervisory Board, Finance in Motion. 
2 The preparation of the paper was financially supported by the German Federal Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) via KfW development bank. The 
author acknowledges with appreciation the support and suggestions provided by Mi-
chael Jainzik, Piero Violante, other KfW staff and authors of other papers presented in 
this publication. 
 (ed.), 
DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-54034-9_7, © The  201
D. Köhn Finance for Food: Towards New Agricultural and Rural Finance, 139
4Author(s)
140 Klaus Maurer 
 
tain extent – for emerging commercial farmers.3 Therefore, the primary focus of 
this analysis of risks and the development of risk management strategies is on 
these hitherto excluded target groups. In addition, smallholders generally consti-
tute the vast majority of farmers in most countries.4 
2 Risks in Agricultural Finance 
2.1 Definitions and Classifications of Risks 
Risks in Agriculture Versus Risks in Agricultural Finance 
The high risks in agricultural finance are commonly quoted as the main con-
straint inhibiting financial institutions from lending to agriculture. Before en-
gaging in more in-depth analysis, a distinction must be made between risks in 
agriculture and risks in agricultural finance. While the former is concerned with 
challenges and risks of agricultural production and marketing from the perspec-
tive of the farmer (real sector view), the latter reflects challenges and risks of 
lending to farmers from the viewpoint of a financial institution (financial sector 
view). Needless to say that both are interlinked, and real-sector risks of agricul-
tural production determine to a large extent the financial-sector risks of agricul-
tural lending. This chapter takes a financial sector perspective and is first of all 
concerned with the risk of agricultural finance where the specific risks of agri-
cultural production form a sub-set of risks. The focus clearly is on credit risk 
although rural financial institutions also face other risks such as market, liquid-
ity, and operational risks. 
Risks in Agriculture: Principal Risks Versus Specific Risks 
The risks that are relevant in agriculture have different characteristics, and they 
can be classified in very different ways. It is not necessary to opt for any particular 
classification of risk, and different ones can be used for different purposes.5 Fol-
lowing Baquet et al. (1997), for example, five major sources of risk in agriculture 
can be defined (OECD 2009): 
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x Production risk concerns variations in crop yields and in livestock produc-
tion due to weather conditions, diseases, and pests; 
x Market risk is related to the variations in commodity prices and quantities 
that can be marketed; 
x Financial risk relates to the ability to pay bills when due, to have money to 
continue farming, and to avoid bankruptcy; 
x Legal and environmental risk concerns the possibility of lawsuits initiated 
by other businesses or individuals, and changes in government regulation 
related to environment; 
x Human resources risk concerns the possibility that family or employees will 
not be available to provide labor or management to the farming business. 
It is clear from the classification above that not all of the risks are specific to agricul-
ture but that some are rather common to all businesses. This is true for most of the 
financial, legal, and human resources risks. Among the risks that affect agriculture 
more specifically are production risks (due to weather, pests, and diseases) as well as 
market and price risks. In recent years, climate change has appeared as a new phe-
nomenon and risk category. Across the globe, it has a considerable influence on ag-
ricultural production and in some parts of the world has led to fundamental changes 
in production patterns and conditions. For the following discussion it is useful to dif-
ferentiate between these principal (or common) risks and specific risks. 
Risks in Agricultural Finance 
Fundamentally, the risks in lending essentially hinge on the borrower’s capacity and 
willingness to repay a loan, with the former depending on the viability of the busi-
ness and the latter on the borrower’s character. This is no different in agricultural 
lending. Here again, it is useful to differentiate between principal and specific risks. 
The risks in agricultural finance comprise to a considerable extent common risks as-
sociated with the viability of the farm business and the farmer’s character, not much 
different from the risks of micro and small businesses in other economic sectors. In 
addition, farm businesses are exposed to specific production and market risks that 
may affect their repayment capacity. Finally, given the strategic importance of agri-
culture for food security, agricultural finance is subject to political interference in 
many countries. This poses significant political risks to agricultural lending institu-
tions since political interventions often turn out to be detrimental to lending to farm-
ers. Hence, the following sections discuss these three categories: principal credit 
risks, specific risks related to agriculture, and political risks. 
2.2 Principal Credit Risks 
Lending to small farmers exposes credit institutions to principal credit risks that 
are similar to those of micro and small enterprises in general. This is explained by 
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similar patterns and characteristics of doing business. One characteristic is the 
high degree of informality as small farmers and enterprises are usually not regis-
tered. Household and enterprise activities are not separated. They are character-
ized by low levels of education and financial literacy. They rarely keep books of 
accounts and only few are able to produce financial statements. Most household 
enterprises do not have assets that could be pledged as collateral for loans from 
financial institutions. 
For such businesses, credit institutions are exposed to significant information 
and monitoring problems. This is due to asymmetric information that exists when 
one party to a transaction (a lender) has less information than the other party (the 
borrower), and the resulting problems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Bor-
rower screening and selection pose a tremendous challenge in such a situation. Fi-
nally, poor legal frameworks and systems create enormous enforcement problems. 
On top of all this, the poor state of the physical infrastructure (roads, electricity, 
telecommunication, etc.) in rural areas in many parts of the world further increases 
the risk and the cost for rural financial institutions. 
Arguably, it is these principal credit risks that have prevented formal financial 
institutions from providing financial services and have resulted in financial exclu-
sion of large parts of the society. This exclusion applies to micro and small enter-
prises and small farmers alike. 
2.3 Specific Risks in Agriculture 
Specific risks in agricultural finance mainly comprise production risk, on the one 
hand, and market and price risk, on the other hand. Financial institutions around 
the globe seem to be reluctant to finance agriculture particularly because of the 
perceived prevalence of these two types of risks. 
Production Risk 
Production risk in agriculture arises from the high variability of production out-
comes. Unlike most other entrepreneurs, farmers cannot predict with certainty the 
amount of output their production process will yield, because of external factors 
such as weather, pests, diseases, and other natural calamities. Such events are 
higher for farmers engaged in monoculture of crops that are particularly sensitive 
to the correct use of high-quality inputs or the timing of harvesting. 
Production risk in agriculture can also be traced to farmers seeking to increase 
their incomes through higher-risk, higher-return cropping strategies (Christen and 
Pearce 2005, p.2). The production of most high-yielding crops is relatively com-
plex, involving careful timing of numerous steps— from preparing land through 
planting, fertilizing, and harvesting. Mistakes or delays at any step can substan-
tially reduce returns—or eliminate them altogether. Moreover, climate change is 
regarded as steadily increasing the production risk (OECD, 2009). 
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Market and Price Risks 
Market risks are typically more pronounced in agriculture than in other eco-
nomic sectors. Both input and output price volatility are sources of market risk 
in agriculture. Prices of agricultural commodities are typically volatile and 
farmers face a considerable price uncertainty. The price of the harvested output 
is typically not known at the time of planting when the production decisions are 
taken. Prices of agricultural commodities vary with levels of production and 
demand at the time of sale. 
Moreover, farmers have no real way of knowing how many others are planting 
a specific crop or how average yields will fare in any given year. Often, a good 
price in one year motivates a lot of farmers to move into the same crop the next 
year. This shift increases production in the face of constant demand, driving down 
the price and making the crop much less attractive the following year.6 Christen 
and Pearce (2005) present the example of Uganda where a bumper maize harvest 
in 2001 and 2002 caused maize prices (and farmer incomes) to fall, significantly 
affecting loan repayment. 
Segmented agricultural markets are influenced mainly by local supply and de-
mand conditions, while more globally integrated markets are significantly affected 
by international production dynamics. In local markets, price risk is sometimes 
mitigated by the “natural hedge” effect, in which an increase (decrease) in annual 
production tends to decrease (increase) output price, while in integrated markets a 
reduction in prices is generally not correlated with local supply conditions, and 
therefore price shocks may affect producers in a more significant way (World 
Bank, 2005). However, even in local markets, distortions may prevent small farm-
ers from benefitting from the “natural hedge.” In many regions and for many crops 
there is a quasi-monopoly by certain local buyers. This may aggravate farmers’ 
exposure to price and market risks. Furthermore, inelastic demand for many agri-
cultural products is often cited as a main explanation for agricultural price vari-
ability where small increases in production can result in large price swings. 
The extreme price swings in the global agricultural markets in the past three 
years has shown how market and price risks can be exacerbated by international 
market conditions. The hausse of the oil price from around US$10 to over US$150 
per barrel in 2008 has dramatically changed the global commodity markets. Since 
then, crops and oil seeds are increasingly used for the production of ethanol and 
other biofuels in many parts of the (developed) world. The emergence of the bio-
fuel industry has become a significant factor and price driver in international 
commodity exchanges. Global markets for staple crops such as wheat, corn, and 
soybeans have become the “battlefield of three giants,” namely the food industry, 
the animal feed industry, and since recently the biofuel industry. The competition 
between these industries is likely to increase in the near to medium term and will 
significantly affect markets and prices across the globe (Rettburg, 2010). 
                                                          
6 This phenomenon was already described in 1928 by a German agronomist and became 
known as “pig cycle”, see Hanau (1928). 
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Finally, governments exert a significant influence on agricultural markets and 
prices in most countries. These and other interventions are dealt with under politi-
cal risks in the subsequent section. 
Level and Correlation of Production and Market Risks 
Production and market risks exist at different levels and scale. Some risk events 
may occur at the micro level and affect a single farm household only, e.g. hail or 
fire, while others happen at the macro level and affect entire regions and countries 
like hurricanes or the recent widespread flooding in Pakistan. In between these 
two extremes, events of regional magnitude (meso level) may affect groups of 
farm households or communities in certain areas, e.g. floods or landslides. 
Another important characteristic is that specific risks are often correlated. Cor-
responding to the levels described above, the correlation of risks can be located on 
a continuum from perfectly independent or idiosyncratic at the micro level to per-
fectly correlated or systemic at the macro level. In between these two poles, co-
variant risks are generally found at the meso level. Accounting for these correla-
tions is crucial in developing efficient risk management strategies (OECD 2009). 
It is clear that correlated risks are difficult to pool compared to independent risks. 
2.4 Political Risks 
For governments in both developed and developing countries, agriculture is a stra-
tegic sector. Ensuring food security is high on the political agenda. In addition, 
agricultural commodities and products are a major export earner in many develop-
ing countries. Moreover, the agricultural sector often provides employment and 
income to a majority of the rural or total population and contributes significantly 
to GDP. This explains the highly political nature of agricultural sector in general 
and agricultural finance in particular, and the considerable degree of government 
interventions and interference in the sector. 
Most countries have experienced politically motivated interventions and undue 
interference from government and politicians. Government interventions are di-
rected either at the real sector, i.e. agricultural production and marketing, and/or at 
the financial sector, i.e. agricultural finance. Both types of interventions constitute 
a major political risk for financial institutions engaged in agricultural lending. 
In many countries, the adequate and affordable supply of staple food crops to 
the growing urban population has been the primary rationale for interventions. 
Hence, price controls and subsidies with the focus on local urban consumers have 
been on the top of the menu of real sector interventions, often at the detriment of 
the rural population and the agricultural producers. In the past, many governments 
have directly engaged in the marketing of certain crops, primarily cash crops for 
export, by establishing state-run marketing boards and warehouses with direct 
price control. However many of these have disappeared in recent years. 
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The creation or removal of tariff barriers can dramatically change local prices as 
the example of Ghana shows (Christen and Pearce, 2005). In the 1990s, the 
Ghanaian government introduced a limited exemption from import duties on white 
maize in response to a crop forecast—which later proved incorrect—that predicted a 
major food shortage. As a result, market prices for maize were depressed in Ghana 
for two years. Another most recent example of the effect of political intervention on 
crop prices has been the Russian prime minister Vladimir Putin’s decision to ban 
Russian wheat exports following the drought and widespread fires last summer – 
combined with irrational market psychology – has caused wheat prices to double in 
international markets from US$4 to US$8 per bushel within a few weeks. 
The record of government interventions in the financial sector or agricultural 
finance is equally long (and discouraging). While most of the features from the era 
of supply-led agricultural finance with state-owned agricultural development 
banks and massive subsidized credit programs belong to the past, agricultural fi-
nance and the financial institutions engaged in the sector continue to be target of 
interventions. The imposition of lending quotas and interest rate ceilings are 
common features in many countries. Unrealistic limits on interest rates and inter-
est margins discourage or inhibit financial institutions from engaging in rural and 
agricultural lending that involves high transaction costs. Even more serious are 
populist interventions such as farm debt relief and debt forgiveness programs. 
Such populist measures expose rural and agricultural lending institutions to con-
siderable risk. 
A striking example in this regard is Thailand where the populist Thaksin gov-
ernment announced a debt moratorium for small farmers in 2001 that seriously 
affected the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC). More 
than two million farmers owing over US$1.7 billion—a third of BAAC’s portfo-
lio— enrolled in the program. As a result, BAAC’s loan write-off rate jumped 
from three percent in 2001 to 12 percent in 2002, and its reserves for bad debt rose 
to 21 percent of its loan portfolio. (Christen and Pearce, 2005) 
Another recent case occurred in India in February 2008 when the government 
announced a comprehensive loan waiver for small farmers, which has been pri-
marily executed by the credit cooperatives. Preliminary data indicate that ap-
proximately 369,000 farmers have benefited from the debt forgiveness. One of the 
immediate impacts has been a steep drop in the recovery rates. Moreover, it has 
negatively affected the overall credit culture: a recent survey showed that one out 
of every four respondents want to wait for another loan waiver. 
2.5 Empirical Evidence on Actual Risks 
The literature reviewed, unfortunately, does not provide any empirical evidence on 
the types of risks that do actually cause losses for farmers and financial institu-
tions. Specifically, no data have been found to confirm the argument that agricul-
tural loans are more risky than others (Meyer, 2011). There are occasional in-
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stances and examples of floods or droughts in certain regions that have led to non-
performing loans or even defaults.7 However, other anecdotal evidence suggests 
that the main reasons for default of small farmers are like with any other micro or 
small business, e.g. the death of the owner, fire, or obvious cases of moral hazard 
and unwillingness to repay. In other words, it seems that in an overall perspective 
the principal risks matter more than the specific risks of agriculture. 
3 Approaches to Risk Management in Agricultural Finance 
Different types of risk call for different risk management approaches. This section 
sheds light on how principal, specific, and political risks in agricultural finance 
can be best managed. 
3.1 Managing Principal Credit Risks 
Typical Risk Management Mechanisms and Their Limitations 
Rural and agricultural lending institutions have developed a number of mecha-
nisms and techniques for managing the risks that arise from farmers’ inability 
and/or unwillingness to repay their loans. For addressing the individual credit risk, 
there are two broad approaches: appraisal of repayment capacity and asset-backed 
lending. The former approach focuses on analyzing the debt capacity of a potential 
borrower using either human experts or statistical models, while the latter focuses 
on the quality and quantity of assets that can be pledged as collateral and how 
quickly that collateral can be liquidated in the event of a default (Wenner, 2010). 
Frequently, a combination of both approaches can be found. 
Asset-Backed Lending: Focus on Collateral 
Many financial institutions, especially commercial banks, pursue an asset-backed 
lending approach and require hard collateral as prime protection against default. In 
general, they require immovable assets – i.e. land – to be pledged as collateral, es-
pecially from farmers whose major – if not sole – productive asset is land. For this 
reason, land as collateral has an important psychological effect on borrowers’ be-
havior because it functions as a powerful incentive device for maintaining the re-
payment morale. 
However, the reality in most countries severely limits the collateral options. 
Firstly, formal collateral in the form of land titles is rarely available. In most 
                                                          
7 Examples are Morocco where the Gharb region was flooded for two consecutive years 
and the leading MFI Al Amana saw an increase of PAR in that region. Also in Mali in 
the Sikasso region, BNDA had high defaults from potato growers following floods in 
2009. Source: personal communication with Christine Westercamp. 
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cases, land is not formally registered, ownership is unclear, and property rights are 
insecure. Secondly, even when land titles are available, contract enforcement 
opportunities are poor. In rural communities it is very difficult if not impossible to 
liquidate and sell land as nobody would acquire land that belonged to a neighbor. 
This is currently experienced by Kreditimi rural I Kosoves (KrK), a rural MFI in 
Kosovo that has piled up land titles and even movable assets such as vehicles, 
which it finds almost impossible to sell in the rural community.8 Thirdly, small 
farmers are extremely reluctant to pledge land as collateral in fear of loss. A loss 
of land would wipe out the basis for existence. Fourthly, the formal registration of 
collateral titles can be very costly relative to the small loan sizes. As a result, the 
overemphasis on immovable collateral (land) has led to significant financial ex-
clusion especially among small farmers. 
Most lending institutions are reluctant to accept movable assets such as agricul-
tural machinery, equipment, and vehicles as collateral due to the absence of se-
cured transactions frameworks and collateral registries for movable assets in many 
countries. The same applies to alternative forms of collateral, e.g. livestock, stand-
ing crop (future harvest), or household equipment that farmers would be more eas-
ily prepared to pledge as collateral. 
Expert-Based Appraisal of Repayment Capacity 
Assessing repayment capacity requires a thorough understanding of the agricul-
tural business, and of the risks and factors that determine success or failure. Agri-
cultural lending requires specific technical expertise among loan officers and 
credit staff, capable of conducting the financial analysis of the borrower and struc-
turing a loan that is tailored to the cash flow of the business. Agriculture requires a 
wide range of expertise, given the variety of crops and production methods; there-
fore, an expert-based evaluation system is expensive to both develop and main-
tain. In addition, technical expertise needs to match with adequate products and 
systems, for example with information technology (IT). 
The inclusion of agricultural experts among credit staff has frequently led to an 
overly technical lending approach. The technical experts focused on agricultural 
“projects” as stand-alone activity, often isolated from the farm household econ-
omy, and developed differentiated loan products for different crops, i.e. “crop 
loans.” Such “project finance” approach, however, is not appropriate for micro 
and small farmers; this has been a key lesson from successful microfinance institu-
tions that apply a holistic approach to farm household enterprises. 
In addition to these mechanisms with focus on individual credit risk, financial 
institutions have developed risk management tools at the portfolio level such as 
diversification, exposure limits, and loan loss reserves. 
                                                          
8 Author’s personal insight as member of the Board of Directors of KrK. 
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Portfolio Management: Exposure Limits and Diversification 
Successful rural financial institutions engage in active portfolio management (1) 
by setting exposure limits for agricultural loans in the overall portfolio and (2) 
through diversification of their portfolios. For example, recent survey data in Latin 
America found that the average exposure to agriculture is less than 40 percent of the 
total portfolio (Wenner, 2010). Microfinance institutions tend to limit agricultural 
lending to less than one-third of their portfolios (Christen and Pearce 2005). Portfo-
lio diversification is done in two ways. Firstly, diversification of the agricultural 
loans by geographic region, commodity, and type of farm household. However, due 
to covariant and systemic risks this technique can be implemented only by large in-
stitutions that operate in more than one agro-climatic zone. Secondly, diversification 
beyond agriculture to include off-farm and non-farm activities and enterprises. 
Building Risk Reserves: Loan Loss Provisioning 
Building risk reserves in the form of loan loss provisions, i.e. an internal absorp-
tion of credit risk, is the last line of defense for a financial institution. It is also the 
most costly measure as it negatively impacts profitability. This will of course de-
pend on the prevailing regulations on loan classification and provisioning. Risk-
based supervision norms that allow specific provisions are not yet prevalent in 
many developing countries. 
The above mentioned typical risk management techniques are useful but they 
can only partially address the information, monitoring, incentive, and enforcement 
problems that prevent agricultural finance from reaching small and informal farm-
ers in rural areas. 
Lessons Learned from Successful Agricultural Lenders 
While most of the state-owned agricultural development banks – agents of the 
“old paradigm” of agricultural finance – have failed, there are a few examples that 
have survived and been transformed into successful rural and agricultural lending 
institutions. The most notable cases are the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand and Bank Rakyat Indonesia (BRI).9 Both of 
these banks have developed systems and mechanisms that enabled them to man-
age the risks of lending to small farmers. 
During the 1980s and 1990s, both banks made the decisive shift from agricul-
tural credit to rural finance. This shift had two dimensions: (1) moving from 
credit-only institutions to full-service financial intermediaries with the introduc-
tion of savings facilities as an important financial service needed and demanded 
by farm households; and (2) a diversification from agricultural credit to rural 
credit for off- and non-farm activities and households. These two features have 
been essential for better managing the risks described above. 
                                                          
9 Literature on BRI: M. Robinson (2001), Maurer (2004) and on BAAC: Yaron (1992), 
Maurer (2000). 
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In response to the collateral problem – many farmers did not have the legal 
documents showing proof of land ownership – BAAC developed a mechanism of 
joint liability groups, and this became an effective risk management device (risk 
pooling) and the trade-mark of BAAC’s lending operations. Client farmers were 
asked to form small, informal groups of about 15 members that serve to guarantee 
the individual farmer’s loans. However, BAAC does not extend group loans. All 
transactions are conducted with the individual members. The groups help BAAC in 
borrower screening, loan appraisal, and verification of data about loan applicants, as 
well as to maintain repayment discipline. In this way, BAAC reached more than 3.5 
million small farmers organized in over 230,000 groups (Maurer, 2000). 
The list of lessons to be learned from these two banks extends further. In fact, 
many rural and agricultural finance institutions from around the world have visited 
BRI and BAAC and have adopted successful elements in their own institutions. 
Contractual Arrangements and Agricultural Value Chains 
Interlinked contracts and agricultural value chains are features that have received 
increased attention. Interlinked transactions between farmers and buyers and in-
termediaries in agricultural value chains can significantly ameliorate asymmetric 
information and the problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, and hence 
reduce the risk for external lenders. 
Financial services can be linked or embedded in value chains. Traders, proces-
sors, and other agribusinesses frequently supply internal finance along the chain 
by linking credit to the delivery of inputs or subsequent sale of produce. However, 
value chain finance has so far been mainly concentrated in higher-value export 
crops or commodities rather than in staple food production for local or regional 
markets. (Doran et al., 2009; Swinnen, 2011) 
Lessons Learned from Rural Microfinance 
Microfinance emerged in the late 1970s and 1980s and has since revolutionized 
traditional views by showing that the poor are bankable (Nagarajan and Meyer, 
2005). Microfinance institutions (MFIs) developed a specific microcredit technol-
ogy that has been highly effective in managing the principal risks of lending to 
small and informal household enterprises. This was further supported by an effi-
cient organization, and standardized products and procedures that kept the cost of 
administering many small loans at reasonable levels. 
Cash flow-based lending has proven a successful methodology for microenter-
prises that have little or no assets, while tiny and very small loans have been ex-
tended to very poor households for livelihood activities through a character-based 
lending methodology. In fact, many MFIs use a combination of both methodolo-
gies. A key factor is the holistic view of the household enterprise and the recogni-
tion that the line between “productive” and “consumptive” expenses is blurred. As 
a consequence, micro loans are for general purpose and not for a specific “pro-
ject,” which in any case is an alien concept to informal household enterprises. This 
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takes into account the fact that most household enterprises – including small farm 
households – have multiple economic activities and income sources as part of their 
own risk management strategy, as shown in the next section. 
Overall, microfinance has shown that it is possible to manage the principal risks 
that arise from the fundamental information, monitoring, incentive, and enforce-
ment problems that exist in the rural and informal sector economies in developing 
countries. However, the other side of the coin is the high administrative cost of 
these successful risk management efforts in microfinance and the resulting, rela-
tively high lending rates required to cover this cost. It is not clear whether all 
farming activities allow to pay such rates. Little analysis has been conducted in 
recent years on rates of return earned in farming relative to interest rates on loans. 
However, empirical studies of the productivity in agriculture and the use of inputs 
like fertilizer suggest the possibility of earning higher returns in agriculture 
(Meyer, 2011). 
The other caveat is that standard microfinance technology offers only a partial so-
lution for advancing agricultural finance. Most microfinance programs until now 
offer only short-term credit and require regular repayment in weekly or monthly in-
stallments that are most suitable for small traders and microenterprises in the service 
sector but are less appropriate for agricultural production and investment. Hence, 
adaptations and fine-tuning to the needs of small farmers will be required. 
Emergence of a New Paradigm in Rural Finance 
Based on the lessons learned from the old paradigm, from successful agricultural 
lenders, and from the microfinance revolution, a new rural finance paradigm 
emerged in the mid-1990s and is still being fine-tuned. This new paradigm reflects 
a financial systems approach, using market principles to deliver financial services 
aimed at rural development and poverty reduction (Nagarajan and Meyer, 2005). 
In terms of risk management, a model is emerging that combines the most relevant 
and promising features of conventional risk management, traditional agricultural 
finance, and microfinance. With this combination, rural financial institutions are 
able to successfully manage the risks of lending to rural microenterprises and 
households – including farm households – to a large extent. The challenge remains 
to adequately account for the specific risks in agriculture – as well as the political 
risks – and to integrate these in a comprehensive risk management approach. 
3.2 Approaches to Manage the Specific Risks in Agriculture 
Financial institutions are particularly reluctant to assume the specific risks in agri-
culture, i.e. the uncontrolled production and market risks, as these translate into 
credit risks that are more difficult to manage. As a consequence, banks seek to 
share or, more preferably, to transfer these risks to third parties. The following 
sections therefore look at potential risk sharing and risk transfer mechanisms from 
a conceptual angle. 
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Segmenting Risks into Layers 
A basic risk management technique consists of segmenting risk into different lay-
ers. This segmentation may help to match each set of risks with different “buyers” 
of risk or available risk management mechanisms (World Bank, 2005). These lay-
ers can be defined along a set of risk characteristics: (1) the level of risk (micro, 
meso, macro); (2) the degree of correlation (idiosyncratic, covariant, systemic); 
(3) the probability of occurrence (frequent, less frequent, seldom); and (4) the 
magnitude of the losses (low, medium, high) (see Appendix 1). 
The first layer refers to losses that are part of the normal business environment 
for an individual farmer (micro level). They are very frequent but cause relatively 
limited losses, for example small weather shocks such as hail. Farmers should 
themselves assume and manage this type of risk with the instruments and strate-
gies that are available at the farm, household or community level. This is “normal 
risk” or risk retention layer. 
The second layer corresponds to risks at the meso level that are more signifi-
cant and less frequent. However, both frequency and magnitude are in a middle 
range affecting groups of farmers or communities, for example a severe weather 
shock leading to floods. In this layer there is scope for farmers to use specific 
market instruments such as insurance or options that are particularly designed to 
deal with farming risk, as far as these are available. This is the market solutions 
(insurance) layer. 
The third layer comprises risks that are catastrophic in nature because they gen-
erate very large losses, even if their frequency is low, for example hurricanes or 
widespread drought. This type of risk is more difficult to share or pool through the 
market mechanism, particularly if it is systemic. For example, the loss and damage 
caused by the Tsunami in Indonesia led to insolvency of one of the largest insur-
ance company in Indonesia. There is a role for government, with the assistance of 
the international donor community, in the case of catastrophic risk. This is the 
market failure layer. 
Risk Retention by Farmers: Prevention, Mitigation and Coping Strategies 
Farmers typically manage the “normal” risk of the first layer with “self-protection” 
or “self-insurance” strategies or activities. It is common to differentiate farmers’ 
strategies into three main categories: (1) prevention strategies to reduce the prob-
ability of an adverse event occurring; (2) mitigation strategies to reduce the poten-
tial impact of an adverse event; and (3) coping strategies to relieve the impact of 
the risky event once it has occurred (OECD, 2009). Risk prevention and mitiga-
tion strategies attempt to address risk ex ante; risk coping strategies address risk ex 
post. Mahul and Stutley (2010) differentiate between technical and financial 
strategies. Technical strategies include, for example, the application of pesticides, 
vaccination to prevent livestock disease, or crop rotation. Financial strategies 
comprise precautionary savings, contingent borrowing, or purchase of crop insur-
ance, if available. 
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Strategies can be based on informal and formal mechanisms. Risk management 
by farmers is conducted mostly through informal mechanisms, especially among 
small and marginal farmers who have limited access to formal mechanisms and 
market instruments such as insurance or hedging. 
Over centuries, farmers have developed a myriad of traditional risk manage-
ment strategies in their respective socio-cultural environments. For example, 
farmers have developed preservation methods and created storage facilities, 
household or community-based, in order to cope with price fluctuations and to 
manage price risks. Farmers in many regions engage in risk sharing arrangements 
through sharecropping. Contractual arrangements such as forward sale of standing 
crop are common mechanisms for farmers to reduce price risk. 
Traditional forms of precautionary savings are found in almost every agricul-
tural society as a coping strategy, e.g. the handful of rice that is taken aside in a 
clay pot before preparing the daily meal. Other traditional forms of saving include 
cattle and other animals, building materials, fire wood, etc. The more important it 
is that rural financial institutions offer savings facilities, a financial service which 
was absent in the old paradigm era of agricultural credit.10 
The risk awareness among farmers is generally high and the significant expo-
sure to production and market risks explains farmers’ risk aversion to new tech-
nologies, methods, or crops. Risk diversification is an important element in farm-
ers’ self-protection strategies. This includes on-farm diversification such as inter-
cropping and crop rotation but also the diversification of income sources to in-
clude off-farm and non-farm activities. Survey data from the Consultative Group 
to Assist the Poor (2005) show that the average share of non-farm household in-
come is considerable: it is highest in Africa (42 percent) and Latin America (40 
percent), but also significant in Asia (32 percent). Through multiple income-
generating activities small farmers are generally better protected to specific risks 
in agriculture than highly specialized commercial farmers, especially those en-
gaged in monoculture and single crop cultivation. 
The menu of tools and strategies that are available can be different in different 
countries and for different farmers, for instance due to their size, location, or 
availability of information, some farmers may have more difficult access to mar-
ket instruments than other farmers. The farmer chooses among available instru-
ments the combination of tools and strategies that best fits his risk exposure and 
his level of risk aversion (OECD, 2009) at reasonable cost. 
Risk Pooling and Risk Transfer: Market Solutions and Instruments 
Risk pooling and risk transfer present solutions to deal with second-layer risks that 
are more significant and less frequent, and where both frequency and magnitude 
are in a middle range. In this layer there is scope for farmers to use additional spe-
cific market instruments, such as insurance or options that are particularly de-
signed to deal with farming risk. 
                                                          
10 Vogel (1984) illustratively termed savings as the forgotten half of rural finance. 
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Traditional Crop Insurance 
Agricultural insurance has existed for many years. According to a recent World 
Bank survey (Mahul and Stutley, 2010),11 104 countries – or more than half of all 
countries worldwide – offered some form of agricultural insurance in 2008. Global 
agricultural premium volume increased dramatically between 2004 and 2007, rising 
from US$8 billion to about US$20 billion. This stunning increase was caused by (1) 
rising agricultural commodity prices and total insured values; (2) expansion of agri-
cultural insurance in China, Brazil, and Eastern Europe; and (3) increasing govern-
ment subsidy support in major countries. However, agricultural insurance provision 
is dominated by high-income countries and China.12 Almost 90 percent of global 
agricultural insurance premium volume is underwritten in high-income countries. 
Crop insurance has been the main product, accounting for an estimated 91 per-
cent by premium volume, while livestock insurance makes up for much of the bal-
ance. There have been two traditional lines of crop insurance: multiple peril crop 
insurance (MPCI) programs and single-peril crop insurance. Most of the MCPI 
programs depend crucially on government support and subsidies. These programs, 
which have mostly been implemented in high-income countries, require levels of 
government support unfeasible for most developing countries (World Bank, 
2005). Historically, the traditional crop insurance programs have performed very 
poorly. Since the 1990s, most developing countries witnessed a shift from public 
to market-based agricultural insurance and governments have promoted agricul-
tural insurance through the commercial insurance sector, often under public-
private partnerships. So far, however, unsubsidized private insurance has mostly 
been limited to single-peril insurance, e.g. hail insurance (OECD, 2009). 
The main difficulty is argued to be the high transaction costs associated with 
crop insurance markets due to information asymmetries, and the resulting prob-
lems of moral hazard and adverse selection. Furthermore, the cost of distribution 
and administration of insurance services is significant for small-scale contracts 
with farmers in remote villages. This makes it nearly impossible to provide tra-
ditional agricultural insurance for small farmers (World Bank 2005). Premiums 
that are too expensive reduce or eliminate the demand from farmers at those 
prices. The demand for insurance is also affected by the relative costs of alterna-
tive strategies such as diversification and financial management (OECD, 2009). 
As an outcome, small and marginal farmers have generally been excluded from 
the traditional agricultural insurance programs, or insurance programs have never 
been effective and cost-efficient enough to compete successfully with coping 
mechanisms employed by the farmer himself. 
                                                          
11 The survey covered agricultural insurance programs in 65 countries, covering 52 per-
cent of high-income countries, 69 percent of middle-income countries, and 50 percent 
of low-income countries that are known to offer some form of agricultural insurance. 
12 In 2008 the agricultural insurance premium volume in China was estimated at $1.75 
billion, making it the second largest agricultural insurance market after the United 
States. (Mahul and Stutley, 2010). 
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Index-Based Insurance 
In recent years, index-based insurance schemes have emerged as an innovative 
and cost-efficient risk management tool that nurtures the hope of policymakers, 
donors, and development organizations that marginal and small farmers in devel-
oping countries can be provided with better support in managing their exposure to 
agricultural perils. In such insurance, indemnity payments are based on an index 
such as cumulative rainfall or aggregate crop yields in a geographical area, and not 
on the individual farmer’s loss incurred. 
Unlike in traditional crop insurance products, asymmetric information problems 
play a much smaller role in index-based insurance schemes. Firstly, a farmer 
mostly has little more information than the insurer regarding the index value, and 
secondly the index value cannot be influenced by individual farmers. Finally, ad-
ministration costs are much lower as it does not require verification of individual 
loss claims, making it more affordable particularly for small and marginal farmers. 
The development of index-based insurance is still at an early stage. Many index 
initiatives in developing countries have been supported by the donor community and 
the international reinsurance market. Most of the weather-based crop insurance pro-
grams are still under pilot implementation, with only few farmers insured so far. 
Hence, it is too early to judge their success, except in India where 400,000 farmers 
purchased weather-based crop insurance in 2008 (Mahul and Stutley, 2010). At pre-
sent, the pilots face a number of technical and other obstacles such as the lack of 
high-quality weather data, inadequate distribution of weather stations, limited supply 
of people with risk-modeling capabilities and expertise in agricultural risk manage-
ment, and weaknesses in regulatory and legal infrastructure. These problems hamper 
the pace of progress.13 Another obstacle for the mechanism is climate change. This 
is imposing a long-term trend of increasing risk, making the insurance approach 
more difficult to apply and more expensive (Doran et al., 2009). 
A major disadvantage of index-based insurance is the so-called basis risk, i.e. 
the risk that payouts (triggered by an index) may not correspond with the losses a 
farmer actually incurs. The basis risk may be substantial, making it difficult for 
farmers to understand and accept (Skees, 2008). In addition, (re)insurance compa-
nies are reluctant to take the reputation risk associated with possible negative me-
dia coverage if poor farmers in developing countries are not indemnified for their 
losses although they bought insurance cover (Levin and Reinhard, 2007). Hence, 
the central challenge of index-based insurance products is to overcome the prob-
lems linked to the basis risk. 
Catastrophic Risk and Market Failure: Risk Transfer to Government 
Catastrophic events like natural disasters and extreme weather events generate 
very large and highly correlated losses, even if their frequency is low. This type of 
                                                          
13 For a more detailed overview of advantages and disadvantages of weather insurance see 
World Bank 2005, Table 4.1, p.18. 
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risk is more difficult to pool and transfer through the market mechanism, particu-
larly if it is systemic, affecting entire regions or even countries. Market failure will 
be the rule. Moreover, climate change has a significant impact on the frequency of 
catastrophic events worldwide. The data from the United Nations International 
Strategy for Disaster Reduction show a dramatic increase in the occurrence of 
natural disasters, particularly of hydro-meteorological events during the last cen-
tury (OECD, 2009). 
It is clear that not all agricultural risks are insurable:14 insurance contracts for 
some risks do not exist because the insurance premium covering all the costs 
would be prohibitive (OECD, 2009). Miranda and Glauber (1997) emphasize the 
need for risk to be independent among the insured, arguing that due to correlations 
among individual yields, crop insurers face portfolio risk that is about ten times 
larger than that faced by private insurers offering more conventional lines of in-
surance (automobile, fire, etc). And also reinsurers are reluctant to take portfolios 
with a probability of very large obligations. Natural disasters like the Tsunami in 
Southeast Asia in 2006, the earthquake in Haiti in 2008, and the recent country-
wide flooding in Pakistan in 2010 are examples of catastrophic risk where market 
instruments break down and which call for the government, supported by the in-
ternational donor community, to step in with emergency aid, disaster relief, and 
safety net provision. 
Synthesis: Structured Risk Management 
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Fig. 1. Structured Risk Management 
Source: Own illustration based on Mahul and Stutley (2010) 
                                                          
14 OECD (2009) lists a number of conditions for the insurability of agricultural risks. 
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Figure 1 above summarizes the preceding sections in a structured risk manage-
ment model that integrates the different risk layers and allocates risk-taking func-
tions according to magnitude of losses. 
The model above contains two intermediate layers at both the low and high 
end. At the low end, it introduces risk pooling by cooperatives and mutuals as risk 
carriers for small losses. This mechanism can, for example, effectively mitigate or 
even eliminate the basis risk in index-based insurance schemes. At the high end, 
re-insurance can play an important role in pushing the frontier of commercial in-
surance toward large and partially systemic risks, thereby increasing the scope of 
market solutions and confining the role of government to truly catastrophic risk. 
Relevance for Financial Institutions 
The concept of risk pooling and transfer through insurance is appealing in theory, 
but reality and thus the benefit for banks is a different story. Traditional crop in-
surance exists in many countries but it requires large amounts of subsidies and the 
vast majority of small farmers have no access to it. The promise of index-based 
insurance is large and expectations are high, but its implementation is still in a pi-
lot stage and its up-scaling potential and sustainability remain untested. Further-
more, climate change is steadily increasing risk, reducing the scope of the insur-
ance approach. 
Credit guarantee funds have been promoted to fill this void, often along with 
technical assistance and training. For example, USAID has been promoting partial 
guarantee programs through its Development Credit Authority (DCA) in several 
countries. Skepticism about the impact, additionality, and sustainability of credit 
guarantee funds go hand-in-hand with (renewed) enthusiasm. There is a new gen-
eration of guarantors – e.g. powerful philanthropic foundations, IFIs, etc. – whose 
contracts with banks have features that could produce outcomes better than those 
of historic government guarantee funds (Doran et al., 2009). Overall, however, the 
case for credit guarantees continues to be unclear, as summarized by Meyer 
(2011): “It is possible that guarantees may provide an additional bit of comfort for 
financial institutions that are interested in testing the feasibility of lending to a 
new clientele group. However, it is unlikely that a guarantee alone will induce 
much additional lending by lenders who do not have such an interest.” 
Hence, until market-based risk transfer mechanisms become broadly available, 
financial institutions will have to rely on their conventional risk management 
techniques such as portfolio diversification and exposure limits. In addition, risk 
retention by farmers themselves will be a first line of defense. Farmers’ preven-
tion, mitigation, and coping strategies are crucially important and banks need to 
learn more about these “self-protection” tools and take these into account in their 
overall risk assessment. In addition, risk pooling through groups and cooperatives 
can be an important complementary feature as the experience of successful agri-
cultural lenders, such as BAAC, shows. 
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3.3 Political Risks Remain a Challenge 
The political risk of government intervention and interference in agricultural fi-
nance, whether persistent or unpredictable, is perhaps the risk most difficult to 
control and to manage by agricultural lenders. In most cases, little can be done to 
prevent interference or mitigate its negative effect. 
BAAC in Thailand, for example, during the 1990s adopted a strategy of ”inter-
ventions against compensations“ through intensive lobbying and policy dialogue 
with the government officials and members of parliament in order to mitigate or 
neutralize the intervention effects on the bank’s financial viability. On the one 
hand, these efforts were partially successful but, on the other, they invited even 
harsher interventions as BAAC’s bargaining power diminished. In 1995 the bank 
was forced to reduce its lending rate for small loans under US$2,400 to loss-
making levels, affecting more than a third of its loan portfolio (Maurer, 2000), and 
in 2001 the government imposed an extensive debt moratorium on farm loans (see 
above). 
The source of funding of agricultural credit can have an influence on govern-
ment. The case of Bank Rakyat Indonesia in Indonesia has shown that if agricul-
tural lenders are mainly financed by local savings deposits instead of refinance 
lines from the government, and if they are under prudential regulation and super-
vision of the central bank they might be subject to interference from government 
and politicians to a lesser extent. 
Amid the recent rise in commodity prices and increasing concerns about food 
security, government intervention in agricultural markets and agricultural finance 
will likely remain a considerable – and perhaps even the greatest – source of risk 
for agricultural lenders. 
4 Implications and Perspectives for Agricultural Finance 
4.1 Towards a Hybrid Model of Agricultural Microfinance 
A hybrid model – or rather models – of agricultural microfinance has been emerg-
ing that combines and incorporates lessons learned from traditional agricultural 
finance, especially from successful agricultural lending institutions, from microfi-
nance, from the financial systems approach in general, and from recent experience 
with innovative insurance instruments. Christen and Pearce (2005) have presented 
ten key features of such a hybrid model (see Appendix 1), much in line with the 
new paradigm of rural finance. 
Some of these features are directly related to credit risk and risk management, 
for example, the principle that repayments are not linked to loan use (feature 1) 
and the character-based lending technology combined with technical analysis (fea-
ture 2). The model suggests to provide savings services (feature 3) that enables 
precautionary savings as an important coping mechanism for farmers. Portfolio 
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diversification is a key element (feature 4) and when loan terms and conditions are 
adjusted to accommodate cyclical cash flows (feature 5) the risk of non-repayment 
is lowered considerably. 
Such hybrid models will expand the frontier of outreach specifically to small 
farmers in distant rural areas, and will help to manage and mitigate much of the 
principal and some of the specific credit risks. As such, the models cater to the 
vast majority of farmers in most countries but they are less applicable to large 
farms and agricultural enterprises. Moreover, as the models seek to incorporate 
innovative market instruments such as index-based microinsurance (feature 9) – 
though still being under development – or contractual arrangements to reduce 
price risk (feature 6) they offer the potential of controlling and managing also the 
specific risks of agricultural finance, at least to the extent that such risks are insur-
able. Certainly, managing catastrophic risk (market failure layer) will remain out-
side of the scope of such model. 
Furthermore, these models serve to reduce the cost of rural and agricultural 
lending. For example, recently developed models of mobile and branchless bank-
ing may provide cost-efficient solutions to reach out to farmers in remote rural ar-
eas (feature 7). 
4.2 Innovative Insurance Instruments Need Further Study and 
Development 
While initial experience with index-based insurance pilot projects seems to be 
very promising, further research and monitoring of these initiatives needs to be 
done to enable conclusions to be drawn about their sustainability, financial viabil-
ity, and implementation on a larger scale. At the same time, advances in technol-
ogy, e.g. the use of satellite images, will lead to a better availability of data needed 
to properly calculate and offer index-based insurance policies (Levin and 
Reinhard, 2007). While the first pilot projects focus purely on the protection of 
small farmers affected by negative weather events, index-based insurance products 
are also attractive to agribusiness intermediaries along the value chain, such as in-
put suppliers, processors and traders whose business operations are correlated with 
agricultural products. A collaboration with (re-)insurance companies can foster the 
development of yield-insurance products that are inexpensive, sustainable, and 
appropriately designed. 
4.3 Diversification to Remain a Core Element of Risk Management 
Diversification is and will remain one of the primary risk mitigation strategies 
used by microfinance institutions and rural banks engaged in agricultural lending. 
For financial institutions, agricultural lending cannot be the primary type of lend-
ing unless robust risk transfer techniques become more commonplace, especially 
for small and marginal farmers. Financial institutions must counter unrealistic ex-
Where Is the Risk? 159 
 
pectations and withstand political pressure to engage non-prudently and exces-
sively in agricultural lending. Under a prudent financial sector approach finance 
follows the real sector. Hence, the share of value added in agriculture as percent of 
GDP may serve as a benchmark for financial institutions’ exposure to agriculture. 
According to the World Bank, in 2008 the average share of agriculture was 7 per-
cent in Latin America, about 12 percent in most of East Asia and Sub-Sahara Af-
rica, and 18 percent in South Asia. Hence, setting a ceiling on the share of agricul-
tural loans between 10 percent and 30 percent of a loan portfolio, depending on 
the region, seems plausible and prudent. 
In addition, diversified portfolios of the financial institutions must be comple-
mented by risk diversification by the farmers themselves. Only a small share of 
the smallholders will grow and emerge as specialized commercial farmers, but the 
large majority of small farmers will likely remain family or household enterprises. 
For these, risk mitigation through diversification of income sources will remain a 
key risk management strategy. Successful agricultural lenders will look more 
closely at the risk retention layer and analyze the farmer’s own risk management 
capacity in terms of prevention, mitigation, and coping strategies as a factor of 
creditworthiness. Precautionary savings play a crucial role and thus it is essential 
that safe, convenient, and accessible savings facilities are offered by financial in-
stitutions. 
4.4 Improvements in Legal Framework and Financial Infrastructure 
In most countries, improvements in the legal and regulatory frameworks are nec-
essary as they pertain to agriculture and agricultural finance. This encompasses 
systems of clear property rights and especially improved cadastre systems related 
to land ownership and registry. Another key element is a strong legal framework 
for secured transactions. Such framework should particularly include a collateral 
registry for movable assets that would allow farmers to pledge equipment and ma-
chinery as collateral as well as facilitate leasing of agricultural equipment. Ex-
panding the collateral options would greatly improve farmers’ access to credit, on 
the one hand, and financial institutions’ risk management, on the other hand. 
4.5 The Role of Government and Donors 
The first and foremost role of government is to refrain from undue interference in 
agricultural finance by adopting a “do no harm” principle. Admittedly, this is eas-
ier said than done. However, politically motivated loan waivers, and other such 
drastic and damaging interventions, have no place in an environment of responsi-
ble finance. Governments around the world should finally move away from the 
old paradigm of directed lending, interest rate controls, and massive subsidies, and 
should adopt lessons learned and support good practices that have emerged under 
the new paradigm of rural and microfinance. 
160 Klaus Maurer 
 
A positive role for the government is seen in creating an enabling environment 
and legal framework as outlined in the previous section, developing the risk market 
infrastructure, enforcement of regulations, and a supportive rural infrastructure. This 
would eventually lead to lower but sustainable interest rates by reducing risks and 
transaction costs and increasing competition. The primary role of government 
should be to address market and regulatory imperfections in order to encourage par-
ticipation by the private sector in providing not only agricultural credit but the whole 
range of financial services including savings facilities and insurance. 
As insurance instruments and other risk transfer mechanisms are being devel-
oped and tested, some public support and limited subsidies may be required. How-
ever, in the medium to long term the government’s role should be confined to 
catastrophic risk as a result of severe events like natural disasters. This is when the 
market fails and the government is needed in a last resort function of disaster relief 
and social safety net provision. 
Donors and development finance institutions (DFIs) have an important advo-
cacy role by engaging in a dialogue with governments on conducive policies and 
frameworks for agricultural finance and by facilitating exchange and learning on 
lessons and good practices. Donor support is most valuable in venturing and pilot-
testing innovative approaches to risk management. The World Bank’s lead initia-
tive in developing and promoting index-based insurance in numerous pilot pro-
jects is an example in this regard. Furthermore, donors and DFIs can facilitate and 
catalyze public-private partnerships (PPP), especially for developing mechanisms 
of risk transfer to the international and global markets. Finally, dealing with catas-
trophic events like the Tsunami in Southeast Asia or the 2010 country-wide flood-
ing in Pakistan is beyond the scope of national governments and thus require con-
certed relief efforts of the international donor community. 
5 Concluding Remarks 
The risk of lending to small famers is not as high, let alone ”prohibitive,” as fre-
quently claimed by financial institutions. A large – if not overwhelming – part of 
the risk can be regarded as principal or normal credit risk, which does not much 
differ from lending to microenterprises in general. These risks can be fairly well 
managed by applying features of the hybrid model of agricultural microfinance 
presented above. 
More difficult to deal with are the specific risks of agriculture. Crop insurance 
– publicly provided and highly subsidized – is available in many countries but is 
not accessible by the vast majority of small farmers. While the concept of risk 
transfer is appealing and would undoubtedly present a first-best solution, the im-
plementation of market-based insurance schemes is still in a pilot stage. 
Until such market-based insurance products become broadly available, agricul-
tural finance will have to rely on second-best solutions. These comprise conven-
tional risk management techniques such as portfolio diversification on the side of 
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the lenders combined with risk prevention, mitigation, and coping strategies on the 
side of the borrowers. 
Finally, it should be emphasized that agricultural finance comprises – or should 
comprise – more than just credit. Farm households need money transfer and pay-
ment services and, most importantly, savings facilities. Savings have been, and 
will continue to be, a key feature of successful agricultural finance institutions. 
Appendix 1: Segmentation of Agricultural Risks 
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Appendix 2: Features of a Hybrid Model of Agricultural 
Microfinance 
Feature 1: Repayments are not linked to loan use. Lenders assess borrower 
repayment capacity by looking at all of a household’s income sources, not just 
the income (e.g. crop sales) produced by the investment of the loan proceeds. 
Borrowers understand that they are obliged to repay whether or not their par-
ticular use of the loan is successful. By treating farming households as complex 
financial units, with a number of income- generating activities and financial 
strategies for coping with their numerous obligations, agricultural microfinance 
programs have been able to dramatically increase repayment rates. 
Feature 2: Character-based lending techniques are combined with techni-
cal criteria in selecting borrowers, setting loan terms, and enforcing re-
payment. To decrease credit risk, successful agricultural microlenders have 
developed lending models that combine reliance on character-based mecha-
nisms— such as group guarantees or close follow-up on late payments—with 
knowledge of crop production techniques and markets for farm goods. 
Feature 3: Savings mechanisms are provided. When rural financial institu-
tions have offered deposit accounts to farming households, which helps them to 
save funds for lean times before harvests, the number of such accounts has 
quickly exceeded the number of loans. 
Feature 4: Portfolio risk is highly diversified. Microfinance institutions that 
have successfully expanded into agricultural lending have tended to lend to a 
wide variety of farming households, including clients engaged in more than one 
crop or livestock activity. In doing so, they have ensured that their loan portfo-
lios and the portfolios of their clients are better protected against agricultural 
and natural risks beyond their control. 
Feature 5: Loan terms and conditions are adjusted to accommodate cycli-
cal cash flows and bulky investments. Cash flows are highly cyclical in farm-
ing communities. Successful agricultural microlenders have modified loan 
terms and conditions to track these cash-flow cycles more closely without 
abandoning the essential principle that repayment is expected, regardless of the 
success or failure an any individual productive activity—even that for which 
the loan was used. 
Feature 6: Contractual arrangements reduce price risk, enhance produc-
tion quality, and help guarantee repayment. When the final quality or quan-
tity of a particular crop is a core concern—for example, for agricultural traders 
and processors—contractual arrangements that combine technical assistance 
and provision of specified inputs on credit have worked to the advantage of 
both the farmer and the market intermediary. 
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Feature 7: Financial service delivery piggy-backs on existing institutional 
infrastructure or is extended using technology. Attaching delivery of finan-
cial services to infrastructure already in place in rural areas, often for nonfinan-
cial purposes, reduces transaction costs for lenders and borrowers alike, and 
creates potential for sustainable rural finance even in remote communities. 
Various technologies show enormous promise for lowering the costs of finan-
cial services in rural areas, including automated teller machines (ATMs), point-
of-sale (POS) devices linked to “smart cards”, and loan officers using personal 
digital assistants. 
Feature 8: Membership-based organizations can facilitate rural access to 
financial services and be viable in remote areas. Lenders generally face 
much lower transaction costs when dealing with an association of farmers as 
opposed to numerous individual, dispersed farmers—if the association can ad-
minister loans effectively. Membership-based organizations can also be viable 
financial service providers themselves. 
Feature 9: Area-based index insurance can protect against the risks of ag-
ricultural lending. Although government-sponsored agricultural insurance 
schemes have a poor record, area-based index insurance holds more promise 
for protecting lenders against the risks involved in agricultural lending. 
Feature 10: To succeed, agricultural microfinance must be insulated from 
political interference. Agricultural microfinance cannot survive in the long term 
unless it is protected from political interference. Even the best-designed and best-
executed programs wither in the face of government moratoriums on loan re-
payment or other such meddling in well-functioning systems of rural finance. 
Source: Christen and Pearce, CGAP 2005 
References 
Baquet, A., Hambleton, R., Jose, D. (1997) Introduction to Risk Management. 
USDA Risk Management Agency. 
Christen, R.P., Pearce, D. (2005) Managing risks and designing products for agri-
cultural microfinance: Features of an emerging model. CGAP Occasional Pa-
per No. 11. 
Doran, A., McFayden, N., Vogel, R.C. (2009) The Missing Middle in Agricultural 
Finance. Relieving the capital constraints on smallholder groups and other ag-
ricultural SMEs. OXFAM Research Report. 
Hanau, A. (1928) Die Prognose der Schweinepreise. Vierteljahreshefte zur Kon-
junkturforschung. Berlin. http://www.diw.de/documents/dokumentenarchiv/17/ 
43353/viertel_1928.pdf. 
164 Klaus Maurer 
 
Höllinger, F., Rutten, L., Kiriakov, K. (2009) The use of Warehouse receipt fi-
nance in agriculture in transition countries. FAO Investment Centre. 
Kloeppinger-Todd, R., Sharma, M. (eds.) (2010): Innovations in Rural and Agri-
cultural Finance. International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and The 
World Bank. 
Levin, T., Reinhard, D. (2007) Microinsurance aspects in agriculture. Discussion 
Paper. Munich Re Foundation. 
Mahul, O., Stutley, C.J. (2010) Government Support to Agricultural Insurance 
Challenges and Options for Developing Countries. Washington DC: World 
Bank. 
Meyer, R.L. (2011) A Review of Subsidies and Investments to Support Agricul-
tural Credit Markets in Developing Countries. http://siteresources. world-
bank.org/INTARD/Resources/Subsidies_as_Intrument_AgFin.pdf. 
Maurer, K. (2000) Agricultural Development Bank Reform: The Case of the Bank 
for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives (BAAC) in Thailand. IFAD. 
Maurer, K. (2004) Bank Rakyat Indonesia. Twenty Years of Large-Scale Microfi-
nance. In: Scaling up Poverty Reduction: Case Studies in Microfinance. CGAP 
& The World Bank. 
Miranda, M.J., Glauber, J.W. (1997) Systemic Risk, Reinsurance, and Failure of 
Crop Insurance Markets. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 79:206–
215. 
Nagarajan, G., Meyer, R.L. (2005) Rural Finance: Recent Advances and Emerging 
Lessons, Debates and Opportunities. Reformatted version of Working Paper 
No.(AEDE-WP-0041-05). Department of Agricultural, Environmental and 
Development Economics. Columbus, Ohio: The Ohio State University. 
OECD (2009) Risk Management in Agriculture – A Holistic Conceptual Frame-
work. Working Party on Agricultural Policies and Markets. 
Rettburg, U. (2010) Wenn das Wetter die Preise bestimmt. Handelsblatt 24/25. 
Robinson, M.S. (2001) The Microfinance Revolution. Sustainable Finance for the 
Poor. Washington DC and New York: The World Bank and Open Society In-
stitute. 
Skees, J.R. (2008) Innovations in Index Insurance for the Poor in Lower Income 
Countries. Agricultural and Resource Economics Review 37(1):1–15. 
Swinnen, J.F.M., Maertens, M. (2013): Finance Through Food and Commodity 
Value Chains in a Globalized Economy. In this volume. 
Vogel, R.C. (1984) Savings Mobilization – the forgotten half of rural finance. 
Economic Development Institute of the World Bank 
Wenner, M.D. (2010): Credit Risk Management in Financing Agriculture. In: 
Kloeppinger-Todd/Sharma (2010). 
Where Is the Risk? 165 
 
Wiedmaier-Pfister, M., Klein, B. (2010) Microinsurance Innovations in Rural Fi-
nance. In: Kloeppinger-Todd/Sharma (2010). 
World Bank & OECD (2004) Achieving Ukraine’s Agricultural Potential. Stimu-
lating agricultural growth and improving rural life. Joint publication. Washing-
ton DC. 
World Bank (2005) Managing Agricultural Production Risk. Innovations in De-
veloping Countries. Washington DC. 
Yaron, J. (1992) Successful Rural Financial Institutions. World Bank Discussion 
Paper No.150. Washington DC: The World Bank. 
Open Access This chapter is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution Non- 
commercial License which permits any noncommercial use, distribution, and reproduction in any
medium, provided the original author(s) and source are credited.
